Review Article

“Violence, Resistance, and Rescue during the Holocaust”

Laia Balcells (Georgetown University) and Daniel Solomon (Georgetown University)

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Laia Balcells is a Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Her first book, Rivalry and Revenge: the Politics of Violence during Civil War, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2017 (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics).

Daniel Solomon is a PhD student in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.


**Abstract**

What do different forms of anti-Semitic violence during World War II teach us about the comparative study of political violence? In this essay, we review three recent political science books about the perpetrators of anti-Semitic violence, the responses of their Jewish victims, and the rescue efforts that helped European Jews evade violence. These books demonstrate promising theoretical, empirical, and methodological uses for the rich historical record about the Holocaust. We use these studies to highlight the methodological innovations that they advance, the blurry theoretical boundaries between selective and collective forms of mass violence, and the possibility of agentive action by perpetrators, victims, and rescuers alike. We conclude by highlighting the social-psychology of genocidal violence and the legacies of these episodes as areas for future inquiry.
Introduction

In a 2012 article in *Perspectives on Politics*, Charles King\(^1\) offered a rhetorical challenge to scholars of political violence: can there be a political science of the Holocaust? King’s essay was more a reflection of the under-representation of the Holocaust in recent theorizing and empirical research about mass violence and political conflict than the total absence of political science from the massive body of scholarship about Nazi Germany and its atrocities against both Jewish and non-Jewish victims. As King observes, Holocaust scholars—some political scientists by discipline, others not—have long seen the political characteristics and dynamics of the Third Reich as central to explaining variations in the scale and scope of anti-Semitic violence in World War II. In her 1979 book, for example, Helen Fein used cross-national variation in Nazi violence to explore competing explanations for the Holocaust.\(^2\) More recently, sociologists like Rachel Einwohner and Thomas Maher have explored why some Jewish civilians in Nazi ghettos and death camps undertook collective action in response to imminent threats of mass killing.\(^3\) The expansive historiographical debate between “intentionalists,” who view the Holocaust as an over-determined consequence of the Nazi regime’s anti-Semitic ideology, and “functionalists,” who attribute the scale of anti-Semitic violence to wartime dynamics, is immediately recognizable to political scientists as a discussion about the macro-level pathways to mass violence.\(^4\)

Missing from many of these earlier accounts is an interpretation of the Holocaust as a complex episode of highly variable violence, rather than a single, monolithic event pre-determined by the ideological intentions and military strategy of senior Nazi officials. As King writes, “the Holocaust might now be described as an array of event categories.”\(^5\) Why, for example, did anti-Semitism manifest as a series of pogroms in Polish and Ukrainian territories in 1941, whereas violence took on different forms in the western territories of the Third Reich during the same period? Systematic empirical research about the scope of the Final Solution and its effects on victimized communities requires that scholars adopt King’s recommended approach and analyze the full array of violent events that took place during the rise, consolidation, and collapse of the Nazi regime.

Three recent books by political scientists—Eugene Finkel’s *Ordinary Jews: Choice and Survival during the Holocaust*; Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg’s *Intimate Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms on the Eve of the Holocaust*; and Robert Braun’s *Protectors of Pluralism: Religious Minorities and the Rescue of Jews in the Low Countries during the Holocaust*—take up the mantle of explaining these variations in the dynamics of anti-Semitic violence during the Holocaust. The three books deal with different aspects of this violence and they each focus on different key actors in the violent events that comprised the Holocaust, namely perpetrators, bystanders, rescuers, and victims.

In addition to enriching our collective understanding of the historical patterns of and responses to anti-Semitic violence during World War II, these books offer important empirical and theoretical insights on different phenomena related to civilian targeting and potential responses to it. Methodologically, the books show that the advanced statistical methods that
underpin much recent comparative research on political violence have a useful home in the rich corpus of historical data about the Holocaust and its political antecedents. Each of the books relies on novel empirical data that demonstrates the variety of perpetrator, victim, and rescuer experiences during World War II. Finkel, for example, uses survivor memoirs to describe the multiple types of Jewish responses to Nazi violence in the Cracow, Minsk, and Bialystok ghettos. Braun uses data from post-World War II restitution bodies in the Low Countries to describe variations in rescue and evasion. Kopstein and Wittenberg use a combination of primary German and Soviet military documents and local Jewish and non-Jewish testimonies to describe the full universe of pogroms during the summer of 1941. Of course, rich micro- and meso-level data do not by themselves resolve the challenges to identify causality with observational data. Braun’s use of spatial analyses and Kopstein and Wittenberg’s ecological inference techniques strengthen the causal validity of their arguments in a way that simpler multivariate regression techniques would not.

In theoretical terms, the patterns of violence presented in these books suggest that the way civilians are targeted may be the result of differing contexts and technologies of violence available, rather than variations in the intentionality of perpetrators’ actions. Identifying observable differences between selective violence—that is, violence targeting specific individuals—and group-selective or collective violence—that is, violence targeting large groups or communities—is a persistent challenge in the literature on political violence, especially civil wars. The group-targeted violence in the cases that the three books describe takes different forms: for example, the pogroms in Poland during the summer of 1941 were instances of wanton but direct violence against Jewish communities, while violence by occupying Nazi forces in the Netherlands involved very selective attacks against Jews based on lists compiled by local administrators. Although similar in motive and intent, violence was collective or selective depending on the level of territorial control as well as of local collaboration available to perpetrators.

The books point to the theoretical possibility of agentive action by perpetrators of violence, victim communities, and would-be rescuers alike. Accounts of extreme episodes of genocidal violence often suggest little room for maneuver: perpetrators act according to their orders, while victims and their potential rescuers have few obvious avenues to resist violence. These three books suggest that human agency—the autonomy to take decisive action—exists despite these oppressive constraints. Research on agency in contexts of political violence has centered on civil wars, but these books open up avenues for future analysis of civilian agency in instances of one-sided violence. The paradoxical relationship between structure and agency in these hard cases is an area of important future inquiry in comparative politics.

We conclude by outlining three crucial avenues of further research that emerge from these books. First, we argue that systematic analyses of violence should more thoroughly account for evidence of the social psychology behind individuals’ actions. These books demonstrate the community-level determinants of risky collective action, but these collective factors cannot explain the heterogeneity of individual participation in violence, resistance, and rescue. Second, we suggest that violence should more often be conceived and studied as a political and social
process. The onset of genocide does not imply a uniform experience for all perpetrators, civilians, or so-called bystanders. Understanding the varied political experiences of individuals and communities during genocidal episodes requires attention to the processual factors that drive both violence and restraint. Third, we contend that further research should better articulate the multiple mechanisms by which communities transmit the legacies of the past, and provide more clear-cut evidence for these legacies. This is particularly relevant when using prewar indicators to explain wartime outcomes (as these authors do) for conflict is likely to change the composition of localities and social networks through violence or displacement.

Ordinary Jews

Eugene (Evgeny) Finkel’s *Ordinary Jews* centers on variation in individual and collective mobilization by the Holocaust’s Jewish victims. While Finkel notes that the Jewish targets of Nazi violence exhibited agency under extreme conditions, he also demonstrates systematic variation in their attempts to survive. Using more than 500 written and videotaped testimonies from Jews who lived through the Cracow, Bialystok, and Minsk ghettos, Finkel shows that the pre-war political conditions of Jewish communities enclosed in Nazi ghettos and individual pre-war experiences of repression together shaped the decision set of the ghettos’ victims.  

Finkel’s empirical analysis relies on a well-specified typology of potential civilian responses to mass violence. Drawing on Albert O. Hirschman’s classic survey of bureaucratic action, *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*, Finkel points to four types of actions—cooperation and collaboration, coping and compliance, evasion, and resistance—that Jewish ghetto inhabitants undertook in response to Nazi coercion. This typology provides a comprehensive portrait of the range of Jewish individual and collective action during the Holocaust. Finkel establishes that Jews who were politically active before World War II were more likely to choose cooperation, public collaboration, or resistance than those who were not, and that this was driven by their history of prior activity aimed at helping, defending, and promoting the community (p. 9), as well as by social ties to others engaged in similar actions and skills for successful organization and mobilization. For example, in places with a larger pre-war Zionist presence, Jews were more likely to have operational security skills that laid the organizational groundwork for subsequent ghetto uprisings. At the other end of the spectrum there were the Jews who engaged in collaboration with the Nazis. In between the two extremes, there were individuals who chose compliance (a tiny minority, he argues), coping, and evasion (a majority of them). Finkel argues that those who were more integrated in non-Jewish society were more likely to choose evasion because they had opportunities to evade successfully (i.e., through non-Jewish friends who would help them), while coping was the dominant strategy among those who occupied a predominantly Jewish social milieu and had Jewish support networks.

In addition to giving greater conceptual structure to historical research on Jewish agency during the Holocaust, Finkel’s typology of Jewish action advances existing descriptive work on civilian self-protection during mass violence episodes, and connects with more recent analytical work on civilian agency in the context of armed conflict. This typology shows that storied forms of
Jewish collective action, like the Warsaw ghetto uprising, were not the only sites of Jewish agency in response to Nazi violence. Even those ghetto residents who chose to participate in the *Judenrat*, the controversial Jewish governing councils that helped administer the Nazi ghettos, chose to do so. The extreme violence of the ghetto regime and past Jewish encounters with repression meant that these choices did not take place under conditions of absolute free will, but they were agentive choices nonetheless.

Finkel’s analysis of Jewish ghetto life gives way to the question of whether similar patterns of pre-war social relations explain behavior in other systems of violence established under Nazi rule. The ghettos were a distinct architecture of the Nazi genocide, implemented—with important exceptions, as in Hungary—in a specific context of expanding Nazi territorial control in annexed areas of Eastern Europe. For Nazi military officials and their local collaborators, the ghetto network that Finkel describes served a different strategic purpose than did the concentration-camp network, the *Einsatzgruppen* killing units, or other means of mass victimization. The heterogeneous forms of violence that took place during the Holocaust raise descriptive and causal questions about the study of Jewish collective action. Were the same strategies of public and private contention available to Jewish concentration-camp prisoners, or did those social contexts require different forms of mobilization? Did the Jewish targets of Nazi and collaborationist militias who experienced similar pre-war conditions as ghetto residents exhibit similar patterns of individual and collective behavior? How did the agency of non-Jewish victims of Nazi violence differ from their Jewish counterparts? For example, we know that a significant number of communist Spanish prisoners managed to cope and resist in concentration-camps such as Ravensbrück. Were they better able to organize coping and resistance strategies because of their pre-Holocaust militant experiences, because they were less intensively repressed as their Jewish peers in the same camps, or both? Given the diverse means of violence by which perpetrators organize episodes of mass harm, specifying the scope conditions of civilian mobilization is an important feature of future comparative research on political violence.

Finkel’s book is brave, in that it brings new evidence to long-lasting and morally challenging debates about topics like Jewish collaboration with Nazi authorities. While not everyone might agree with Finkel’s interpretation of Jewish collaboration, he brings new, provocative insights and careful evidence to these debates. For example, Finkel distinguishes between *collaboration* and *cooperation* of Jews with Nazi authorities. He argues that collaboration and cooperation differ in the intended goals of the actions taken: “Those who cooperated acted to preserve the community and its individual members; those who collaborated knowingly worked to the detriment of the community’s or individual Jews’ survival. Cooperation was open and visible, while collaboration could be of two basic types—public, as in the case of corrupt and self-serving chairs of the Judenrats; or private (often, but not always secret), as in the case of paid informants” (p. 73). He also establishes that people with previous political experience tended to be overrepresented among those who chose the former, while there was no link between previous political activism and private collaboration.
The distinction between cooperation and collaboration that Finkel puts forward is thought-provoking, but it is also problematic for a number of reasons. First, by cooperating with the Germans, these Jewish leaders were facilitating the Nazi regime’s violence against members of the leaders’ own communities. Cooperation was thus not observationally different from collaboration in that it ultimately facilitated the victimization of Jews. Second, this distinction is based on intentions of actions, and not on observed actions. For example, Finkel tells us that Ephraim Barasz, a Jewish leader in the Bialystok ghetto, was a cooperator and not a collaborator, because he wanted to help the Jewish community and his intentions were “noble and sincere” (p. 97). Yet Finkel also explains that Barasz took actions such as not informing the resistance about deportation orders he received in February 1943, which deprived them of crucial hours of preparation (p. 93). There is no way for us to know whether Finkel is right to argue that Barasz behaved this way in order to try to save the community and not himself, and this action ultimately facilitated the deportation and victimization of Bialystok’s remaining Jews. Imputation of intentions from actions is problematic, as human beings are complex and multifaceted, and they might behave with different intentions at different moments in time. Also, intentions can often be hazy. The evidence Finkel draws on is not sufficient to establish that Barasz acted with specific intention—what evidence would? Barasz could write or say that he was doing things to help the community while he might have been doing them just to save her own life. This caveat arguably applies to the rest of Finkel’s book, as the type of evidence he draws on from is not sufficient to be able to “demonstrate” the causes of Jewish behavior in the three ghettos and beyond. The evidence he provides is suggestive, but not conclusive.

Another question that remains open in this book is whether incentives or opportunities were the ultimate determinants of ordinary individuals’ behavior. In the chapter on coping and compliance, Finkel argues that the vast majority of Jews opted for the strategy of coping because they were neither presented with the opportunity nor endowed with the capability to collaborate, escape, or resist (p. 100). Thus, their behavior did not depend on their individual knowledge, beliefs and/or incentives; it mostly depended on opportunities to behave in particular ways, which were given by the particular context in which they were living. This leaves some questions regarding the causal mechanisms in this book. Are pre-war experiences shaping incentives or are they shaping opportunities for different types of behavior? Put differently, if macro- and meso-level structures offer little room for individual choice, does it matter if individuals have experience and skills for resistance? Or are these past experiences and skills shaping the structures in which individuals find themselves in? The theory in this book seems to draw on both incentives and opportunities, but at times one is left wondering if this makes Finkel’s theory of Jewish agency somewhat over-deterministic.

Overall, Finkel’s book makes an important contribution in the study of mass violence and genocide, as--contrary to much of the current political science literature on civilian victimization--he redirects focus to the victims and their responses to violence. Although the actions of perpetrators have the most impact on the outcomes of violent processes and events, Finkel contends that victim behavior also affects these outcomes and can ultimately make violence more or less prevalent. While the topic of victims and their agency is a growing focus for scholars of political violence, it is quite novel in the study of genocidal violence. In the
context of a process of mass organized violence such as the Holocaust, the tendency has been to think of victims as lacking much agency to alter outcomes. This book argues for a different vision, and in this regard not only is it courageous, but also opens new avenues of research about the Holocaust and other processes of mass violence.

**Intimate Violence**

Jeffrey Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg’s *Intimate Violence* explores pogroms against Jews in Polish and Ukrainian communities of Poland’s eastern borderlands during the summer of 1941. This book is thus about the perpetrators of violence of a specific type: communal violence against Jews. The summer of 1941 saw new and pervasive anti-Semitic violence by a multiplicity of armed groups, including both nationalist militias and German soldiers and paramilitary forces. The pogroms present a particular puzzle: that of anti-Semitic violence by local community members not formally a part of any armed organization.

“Neighbor-on-neighbor” violence has long transfixed Holocaust scholars, especially in the wake of the historiographical controversy surrounding Polish-American sociologist Jan Gross’s 2000 study of the pogrom at Jedwabne, Poland, *Neighbors*. Gross’s documentation of the killing of multiple hundreds of Jews at Jedwabne redirected scholarly attention towards local Polish complicity and responsibility for acts previously associated with occupying German forces. Kopstein and Wittenberg build on Gross’s insights on the role of local actors in the perpetration of violence against their Jewish neighbors to develop a more nuanced and systematic theory about why pogroms during the summer of 1941 took place in some localities and not others. The Jedwabne violence was one in an intense wave of pogroms that occurred in the context of the rapid exchange of territory between Nazi and Soviet forces during Germany’s Operation Barbarossa campaign. These pogroms did not happen in all Polish localities, however, and exploiting local variation in the incidence of communal violence helps clarify their causes. In this exercise of what they call “comparative microstructuralism”, and following the example of Kalyvas’s seminal book on civil wars, Kopstein and Wittenberg set another good example of comparative political analysis of a complex historical event such as the Holocaust.

In their account, Kopstein and Wittenberg argue that the pogroms can be explained mostly by political factors. In particular, the political landscape of localities made some local communities more prone to engage in violence against their Jewish neighbors, when the Nazi occupation and the consequent state collapse opened a window of opportunity for this violence. In empirical terms, they find that the larger (1) the electoral support for “ethnically accommodationist political parties” like Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR), (2) the relative size of the Jewish community, and—crucially—(3) local support for Jewish nationalism, the higher the likelihood of pogroms in a locality. For Kopstein and Wittenberg, the strength of Jewish nationalism during the interwar period captures both the relative size of the local Jewish community and the vigor of their claims for political representation and national rights. The authors argue that these political claims were especially threatening to Polish and Ukrainian nationalists, who had lost power during the Soviet occupation of the borderlands and faced uncertainty about their future political status when
the Nazis invaded. As Gross, Kopstein and Wittenberg themselves, and others have
documented extensively, the loss of national autonomy gave new life to conspiratorial theories
of “Judeo-Communism” and collective Jewish animosity towards other (and especially Polish)
national claims.20

Kopstein and Wittenberg argue that members of dominant social groups--in this case, Polish
and Ukrainian nationalists--view relatively strong minorities like Polish Jews during the interwar
period as a threat to their political and social status. These threat perceptions mean that
dominant groups are more likely to attack minorities once a violent episode has begun. And, in
the summer of 1941, the context of “state collapse” meant that the eastern borderlands were
especially ripe for collective violence. “Power-threat” or “group-threat” theory is an important
foundation for historical and comparative research about collective violence--especially in
sociological studies of inter-racial violence in the United States21--and Kopstein and
Wittenberg’s use of electoral data from the interwar period is a novel means of specifying and
testing the theory’s observable implications. However, the authors’ reliance on these
observational data also raises an important challenge of empirical analysis: do the variables
most associated with violence--especially the concentration of support for Jewish nationalism--
provide unambiguous evidence for the power-threat theory? It is true that nationalist myths
held up Jewish civil society as a unique threat to Polish and Ukrainian aspirations, and that
these perceptions were a pervasive part of both political cultures in the run-up to the 1941
pogroms? In 1922 and 1928, the years from which Kopstein and Wittenberg draw their
electoral data, the Jewish vote share for nationalist parties might have been a reliable measure
of the political strength of Jewish civil society. But the perceived threat of Jewish mobilization
was likely a pretense, not a cause, of anti-Semitic violence. From the standpoint of 1941, Jewish
nationalist mobilization was not a credible threat to Polish or Ukrainian national claims. Nor was
Jewish nationalism perceived as such by pogrom organizers, many of whom were previously
active in violent nationalist movements--a historical theme that mirrors Brass’s general concept
of an “institutionalized riot system.”22 The rapid process of Sovietization and the looming threat
of Nazi invasion all but destroyed Jewish civil society and the possibility of collective political
action by Jewish communities in the borderlands, notwithstanding prominent examples of
Jewish participation in the civil administration of the Soviet occupation.23

The simplest interpretation, which Kopstein and Wittenberg reference but do not favor, is that
pogroms were most likely where Jews were most visible, or in which they played more
prominent roles in public life. As with other social movements, more visible targets become an
effective symbol for social mobilization. The visibility of victimized Jewish communities may
help explain the peculiar repertoire of pogrom violence in the borderlands. The 1941 attacks, in
particular the Jedwabne massacre, featured gruesome spectacles such as public humiliation,
stoning, and clubbing. Although many of these acts resulted in the deaths of their Jewish
targets, these “carnivalesque” techniques also align with Fujii’s concept of “extra-lethal
violence,” or “face-to-face acts of violence that transgress shared norms about the proper
treatment of person.”24 As with lynching, these public acts of violence intimidate, send
exclusionary signals to minorities, and perhaps encourage displacement, but they do not
eliminate social threats, per se. Had threat removal been the main objective of the violence, we
should expect the pogrom organizers to have used other tactics associated with the removal or neutralization of rival elites. The public performance of this violence suggests a different logic at play.

In conclusion, this is an important book that explores a difficult, understudied phenomenon with historical data, the limitations of which the authors manage to overcome in astute and innovative ways. If Neighbors launched two decades of new historical research about local complicity and mobilization during the Holocaust, Kopstein and Wittenberg have further raised the bar by grappling with the empirical variations in proximate pogroms and their implications for theories of collective violence. In empirical terms, the rich data on the 1941 pogroms that Kopstein and Wittenberg compiled for this project will undoubtedly serve both historians of the Holocaust and political scientists seeking to further explore its causes and legacies.

Protectors of Pluralism

In his book Protectors of Pluralism: Religious Minorities and the Rescue of Jews in the Low Countries during the Holocaust, Robert Braun seeks to explain a category of individuals and communities whose actions have received less systematic attention from scholars of both the Holocaust and political violence: the rescuers. Notable instances of rescue have achieved near mythic status in popular discussions of the Holocaust and other genocides, as exemplified by blockbuster films like Schindler’s List and Hotel Rwanda, and the State of Israel’s efforts to celebrate the “Righteous Among the Nations”—non-Jews responsible for heroic acts of personal sacrifice during the Holocaust. As Braun argues, early scholarship on the phenomenon of rescue during genocide emphasized the individual characteristics of rescuers, or else sought to explain why some nations, in toto, complied less with the architecture of Nazi genocide than others. But the structural determinants of variation in patterns of rescue, a particularly risky form of collective action during episodes of one-sided violence, were not well understood.

Braun shows that the specific experiences of minority communities in the Netherlands and Belgium—the Low Countries—made Jewish evasion of Nazi deportations during World War II possible. Through a battery of statistical tests and process tracing of one minority rescue movement in the region of Twente, Braun demonstrates that a combination of cross-minority solidarity and a capacity for resistance rooted in past experiences of repression account for differing levels of Jewish evasion—and, therefore, effective rescue—following the onset of Nazi deportations in 1942.

The central contributions of Braun’s book are twofold. First, Braun’s emphasis on the theoretical importance of clandestine collective action and his approach to the methodological obstacles to research about the topic are valuable additions to the existing research agenda on collective responses to one-sided violence. In contrast to the more public forms of collective action central to the contemporary study of contentious politics, clandestine action involves the mobilization of communal resources, in secret and at great risk to the physical security and social status of its participants. In this case, this clandestine action aimed at protecting victims
of selective violence from extreme harm. Patterns of trust, inter-group relations, and risk differ
in conditions of secrecy, and Braun’s analysis of rescue in the Low Countries provides a valuable
model for theorizing about these distinctions. Braun aims to understand why, despite common
macro-level experiences of the Holocaust and denominational affiliations, different parts of the
Low Countries displayed differing patterns of “clandestine collective action” during the
Holocaust. Following Finkel, Braun’s analysis of clandestine rescue provides a fuller portrait of
the experiences of rescuers during the Holocaust and the social forces that contributed to their
behavior.

Second, Braun makes use of a wealth of archival data from the Nazi occupation of the
Netherlands and Belgium, clandestine wartime media sources, and postwar trial and restitution
programs, to address the measurement challenges associated with clandestine collective
action. Successful covert actions are difficult to observe by design; failed instances of
clandestine mobilization might also result in the destruction of movement records and archives.
Even with the most comprehensive data, obstacles to inference remain: it is possible that Jews
simply lived in locations prior to the Nazi occupation that made them easier to rescue. In
addition to using statistical methods like instrumental variables to show that exogenous
features of minority settlement predicted patterns of Jewish evasion, Braun also makes use of
observational data to show the causal pathways that enabled Jewish evasion. Take, for
example, Braun’s analysis of minority empathy in the Netherlands. Through comparative
content analysis of depictions of Jews in Dutch Catholic publications during the pre-World War
II period, Braun shows that Catholic publications in Protestant-majority areas were more
resistant to common anti-Semitic frames than their counterparts in Catholic-majority regions.
Braun’s careful documentation of these distinct frames provides evidence that, despite
ubiquitous anti-Semitism in the pre-World War II Netherlands, Catholics living in Catholic-
majority versus Catholic-minority areas had different collective attitudes towards their Jewish
neighbors. These differences provide convincing evidence for Braun’s argument that empathy,
alongside the organizational capacity of committed and relatively isolated religious minorities,
were the conditions that made evasion possible.

An important shortcoming of the study relates to the inferences that Braun draws from the
primary outcome variable, Jewish evasion, in his statistical models for rescue in the
Netherlands. To measure evasion, Braun uses an impressive statistical matching technique that
compares the individual names of Jews collected by German administrators in late 1941 and
1942 to those on a combined list of Jewish war victims and concentration-camp survivors. It
stands to reason that Jewish evasion—that is, successful rescue—is a valid indicator of
clandestine collective action by religious minorities. As Finkel’s analysis shows, evasion did not
happen in isolation: it required sustained access to a network of secret residences,
communications outside the zone of Nazi occupation, and means of protection and care.
Braun’s case study of the Twente rescue operation shows that these networks were necessary
features of Jewish evasion. In only measuring those successful instances of clandestine action,
however, Braun risks restricting his observations to the outcomes of rescue efforts, and not the
rescue operations themselves. The structural variables that Braun describes—collective
empathy and organizational capacity—should also explain those instances in which rescue
operations took place, but failed to result in similar levels of Jewish evasion. A more convincing measure of clandestine collective action would measure all instances of direct mobilization by minority groups, rather than their consequences. Although the scope of the observational data make this difficult, perhaps impossible, we should adjust accordingly the theoretical conclusions that we can draw from Braun’s empirical findings.

Additionally, Braun’s analysis could do more to illuminate the characteristics of the individual clergy and lay officials that Braun uses to illustrate these empirical variations. How did these networks of individuals change over time, following the onset of clandestine action? What distinguishes the behavioral patterns of those individuals and communities that participate in rescue networks, a form of high-risk collective action, from those who adopt other collective responses to atrocities? It is not Braun’s role to answer each of these questions, but they point to necessary future research on the dynamics of clandestine collective action.

In this book, Braun brings forward a story about the combined importance of “capacity” for collective action and “empathy” towards outsiders. Understanding the interactive role of these two factors is an important contribution to the emerging scholarship on rescue and high-risk collective action. After all, we often see groups with a capacity for clandestine collective action not use such capacity to help other groups: for example, local minorities ignoring the suffering of other minorities, or highly committed or sect-like groups that refrain from assisting their counterparts. This path-breaking book opens many avenues of research, but that of empathy--under which conditions it is more likely to emerge and to shape individual and collective behavior--is a crucial one. The local position and network embeddedness of a religious and national group might just not suffice, and the collective psychology that motivates high-capacity groups to act in exceptional ways is a promising area of future inquiry.

**Methodological Contributions**

Each of the three books provides a model of methodological innovation in comparative political research. Their use of sophisticated statistical methods, their creative approach to historical data, and their combined use of empirical methods shows the promising direction of descriptive and inferential research about mass violence.

In the last two decades, quantitative analysis of observational data at the individual and community levels has become a common standard for comparative research on subnational patterns of political violence. Although these techniques are a useful tool for explaining recurring outcomes in large datasets, methodologists have also demonstrated the multiple ways in which unobserved factors can undermine statistical inferences. These include problems of autocorrelation, which implies that events that take place in chronological or spatial proximity to one another exhibit common tendencies and may influence one another, and ecological fallacies, wherein conclusions about individual or small-group preferences or behaviors are drawn from group-level indicators. Two of these books use advanced statistical methods to address some of these methodological challenges: Braun, through spatial regression models, and Kopstein and Wittenberg, through ecological inference estimations.
The methodological innovations in these three books are possible, in large part, because of the wealth of historical knowledge about and post-World War II documentation of the Holocaust. The end of the war brought about an expansive, diverse regime of transitional justice, ranging from local efforts like community *Yahrzeit* books that record and memorialize the dead, to national restitution bodies intended to compensate Jewish survivors for property seized during the Nazi occupation. If the Nazis had been meticulous in recording their bureaucracy of mass violence, these transitional justice processes did as much to document the extent of its harm. All three books make creative use of these sources to measure the effects of violence and difficult-to-observe patterns of collective action in varied locations during World War II. Braun’s analysis of clandestine networks in the Twente region of the Netherlands, for example, relies on a combination of postwar pension research about rescue operations and trial transcripts about instances of local collaboration. In the absence of direct polling information about political attitudes, all three books use electoral data from Europe’s brief interwar experiment with procedural democracy to demonstrate the aggregate political preferences of localities involved in the enactment of and resistance to anti-Semitic violence. These efforts affirm the methodological importance of conflict archives for studying the meso- and micro-level dynamics of political violence, in addition to their contributions to general historical understanding of the Holocaust.  

Relying on these indirect measures of political attitudes and behaviors, however, leaves some room for inferential ambiguity. The municipal-level indicators on which Kopstein and Wittenberg rely, for example, make it difficult to adjudicate between the “power-threat” and “political visibility” logics of pogrom violence in contexts of electoral competition. While the authors’ ecological inference models make some progress in estimating individual-level behavior from municipal-level indicators, they cannot capture the social psychology of the pogrom organizers or participants. To prove that the *perceived* power of Jewish victims, and not their visibility, explains variation in pogrom violence, Kopstein and Wittenberg would need to demonstrate that group insecurity, anxiety, or rapid changes in social status—in addition to electoral support for pogrom organizers’ political opponents—are also associated with the occurrence of violence in 1941. Unfortunately, the municipal-level electoral data leave unanswered these important questions about the social psychology of public, collective violence like pogroms. 

Finkel, for his part, digs more into the psychology behind the different actions taken by ordinary Jews in the midst of their persecution, and he does it drawing from over 500 testimonies that he accessed, read or viewed. While relying on much more direct measures of individual motives, he also faces limitations: first, testimonies can bias the explanation of their actions and they can mask their true intentions. For example, among the 51 testimonies he selects, none argues that they collaborated with the Nazis. Survivors may also find it difficult to remember perfectly their own experiences, partly as a result of trauma and partly as a result of changes in post-conflict narratives. Second, while this kind of data is much more accurate in measuring intentions, it may not be representative of the population under study. As Finkel admits,
“testimonies overrepresent the experiences of those who survived and were available and willing to be interviewed decades after World War II.” (p. 211).

There is not much that can be done to get around the limitations that each of the data sources provide, but the combination of data sources and methods that all three books use should reassure us about the robustness of their findings. For example, Kopstein and Wittenberg combine statistical analyses of a dataset comprising over two thousand localities in six provinces (voivodeships) with case studies of localities, which help illustrate the mechanisms in place. They also analyze outlier cases in which their theoretical predictions do not fit the empirical patterns. Finkel uses a “large-n” dataset on ghetto uprisings to provide more generalizable results about one aspect of his theory, resistance. And, as stated above, Braun combines sophisticated empirical methods applied to geocoded data with a postwar survey, content analysis of prewar claims by opinion leaders and newspapers, and analyses of postwar testimonies, postwar trial data, and Nazi archives.

In addition to their methodological innovations, the three books demonstrate the wide-ranging theoretical and empirical implications of the Holocaust for comparative knowledge about mass violence. Below, we discuss two cross-cutting themes in current comparative research on political violence--the distinction between selective versus collective targeting (and the determinants of each of these types of violence against civilian populations), and the interplay between structure and agency in conditions of extreme violence--that are clarified by the books’ examination of different types of atrocities during the Holocaust.

Selective Violence versus Collective Targeting

The particular dimensions of collective targeting during the Holocaust illuminate outstanding theoretical issues in the recent political science literature on the logic of violence against civilians. What makes violence targeted versus indiscriminate? How do we observe this distinction? In his research on the logic of violence against civilians during civil wars, Kalyvas draws a sharp line between selective violence, in which the target of harm is determined by the behavior or identity of specific individuals, and indiscriminate violence, which targets whole civilian populations, with no identification process whatsoever. Other scholars have observed that there is a distinct intermediate category of violence in which individuals are targeted collectively because of their membership to given social groups or categories; they have named it “collective targeting” (Steele) or “categorical violence” (Goodwin).

For their part, scholars of identity-based violence like genocide emphasize the intentionality or systematicity of violent acts as the distinguishing feature of collective targeting. In the most general terms, the Holocaust was an instance of large-scale collective targeting. Although the marked variation in the experience of and responses to anti-Semitic violence that makes Finkel’s, Kopstein and Wittenberg’s, and Braun’s studies possible points to the theoretical value of disaggregating the Holocaust, the common thread that runs throughout each episode is the empirical fact that Jews, individually and collectively, were more likely to be targeted by both Nazi violence and local militias than were most non-Jews.
The episodes of one-sided violence that make up the Holocaust, however, suggest that the distinction between selective, collective-targeted, and indiscriminate attacks relates more to the technology of violence rather than to its perpetrators’ intent. The anti-Semitism of the Nazi regime’s governing ideology was an inescapable feature of the Holocaust, but it cannot explain local variations in the types of violence that different perpetrators employed throughout the war. What, then, accounts for these variations? One explanation appears to be the nature of territorial control. As with the ghetto system, the consolidation of German territorial control was a prerequisite for the creation of the camp architecture in Poland. Where they were able to create a governing administration, the Nazi regime was more apt to establish systems of violence like concentration camps that required and aided the significant industrial capacity of the German war effort. In contexts of hegemonic—albeit not total—state control, such as the Nazi-occupied Netherlands, German authorities possessed the administrative capacity to compile individually selective lists of potential deportees, as well as a sufficient degree of local collaboration to enable the accuracy of that selective targeting. Where the Nazis could not or had not yet created a consolidated administration, they delegated violence to roving special units like the Einsatzgruppen or to local militias. The conditions of state collapse during the Nazi occupation of the eastern borderlands created an environment—similar to other precursors to pogrom violence—in which rumors and misinformation were widespread. The uncertainty of these contexts made collective—and often public—attacks a more common strategy of violent mobilization. Thus, the differing repertoires of violence and the contexts in which they emerged created divergent opportunities for collective action by both victimized civilians and would-be bystanders.

Structure and Agency

What were these opportunities for collective action? Who possessed agency—an ability and capacity to make autonomous decisions—during an extreme episode of one-sided violence? Conventional explanations of the Holocaust portray the event as totalizing and unaccommodating in its scope. This prevalent view is perhaps best summarized by Hannah Arendt’s description of the conditions of agency under totalitarian rule: “The prolongation of [Jewish] lives is due to charity and not to right, for no law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of opinion is a fool's freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow.” The works by Finkel, Kopstein and Wittenberg, and Braun suggest, by contrast, that social actors possessed at least some agency during the Holocaust, although that agency was subject to individual, collective, and macro-level constraints. Nazi plans for the Holocaust may have made anti-Semitic violence a virtual certainty, but they did not preordain a specific experience of that suffering among all Jewish communities.

The agency of civilian actors during instances of mass—both civil and one-sided—violence has received a good deal of attention in recent comparative conflict scholarship. Findings from the Holocaust are a meaningful contribution to this growing body of empirical evidence because of
the position of Nazi atrocities at the extreme end of the global distribution of episodes of mass threats to civilian security. Kalyvas indicates that in multi-sided conflicts, the “locus” of civilian agency lies in the “convergence between local motives and supralocal imperatives”--that is, the ability of individual civilians to manipulate widespread violence for private purposes.\textsuperscript{41} If this is the case, we should not observe civilian agency in the context of extreme episodes like the Holocaust. In theory, violence during the Holocaust was not a divisible good: Jews stood nothing to gain from collaboration, and neither Nazi security forces nor indigenous perpetrators stood to benefit from restraint. And yet, examples of individual choice in the gravest circumstances abound.

Finkel points to previous experiences with repression and pre-existing social networks as joint explanations for this conundrum. In Polish ghettos, who Jews knew, what they knew, and where they came from were important predictors of Jewish survival strategies. These are structural explanations, in that they describe fixed characteristics of Jewish individuals and communities that do not relate to the contingent conditions of ghetto life. Finkel’s findings are broadly consistent with network-centered explanations for civilian collective action in episodes of occupation or civil war.\textsuperscript{42} These networks appear to be something of a double-edged sword, however. The findings from Kopstein and Wittenberg’s study suggest that strong social bonds--empirically, more prominent Jewish social movements--also increased risks of targeted violence against Jewish groups. Finkel’s and Kopstein and Wittenberg’s combined conclusions reveal a paradox that places with more capacity for resistance may also have been places with a higher likelihood of collective targeting.

Of course, victims were not the only actors in the midst of the Holocaust that dealt with questions of agency and its constraints. For both perpetrators and rescuers, pre-violence networks also appear to play a determinative role in the possibility of violent and altruistic collective action, respectively. From fortified concentration camps to more anarchic conditions of state collapse, would-be perpetrators made critical decisions about the extent to which they would participate in abuses against Jewish and other civilians. Not all Poles or Ukrainians in the eastern borderlands elected to participate in pogrom violence, and even fewer joined in the carnivalesque tactics adopted by pogrom organizers. Kopstein and Wittenberg note, following other studies of the network responsible for the 1941 violence, that many of the organizers across localities had been imprisoned by Soviet authorities and had pre-war links to Polish and Ukrainian nationalist movements. In the Low Countries featured in Braun’s work, it was the (minority/majority) status and existing capacity of religious groups that gave them the ability to decide how and whether to provide information, resources, and other forms of support to armed actors. Where these networks encouraged and permitted rescue, collective action was more possible than where those networks discouraged the same.

**Avenues for Future Research**

Even as the impressive work by Finkel, Kopstein and Wittenberg, and Braun make strides in theoretical and empirical knowledge about violence against civilians, important research gaps remain. In this concluding section, we highlight three areas for additional inquiry, both in the
political science of the Holocaust and broader political science research about the determinants and dynamics of extreme violence.

First, all three books point to the limits of our collective understanding of the social psychology of risky collective action. How do would-be perpetrators, targeted communities, and those involved in their rescue understand the process of imminent violence and potential individual and communal responses to it? Are individual and group behavior in these extreme conditions the result of fixed biographical characteristics, or a consequence of dynamic and situationally idiosyncratic contexts? The three books do much to complicate the influential idea that “perpetrators, bystanders, and victims” are comprehensive categories of collective action that perfectly predict individual and group behavior during the Holocaust.\(^43\) The theoretical parsimony and seeming normative clarity of these distinctions have led scholars working on topics beyond the Holocaust to integrate the three-part framework into their analysis of genocide and other forms of mass group-selective violence. But recent sociological research suggests that individuals cross “behavioral boundaries” that their membership in a specific “perpetrator” or “victim” group does not anticipate.\(^44\)

Given the growing research agenda in psychology and sociology on the behavioral characteristics of perpetrators,\(^45\) victims, and rescuers during genocide and similar types of violence, the absence of social-psychological theories from prevailing political science research on one-sided violence likely has to do mostly with obstacles to large-n measurement in violent contexts. Each of the three books relied on access to large troves of municipal-level information such as pre-war voting patterns, with only Finkel using individual accounts to assess individual choices of Jewish ghetto inhabitants. These municipal-level data allow for systematic analysis of subnational variation in the dynamics of violence without major concerns about biases in the data. Representative samples of individual or small-group behavior in conditions of extreme violence are harder to achieve, given the logistical and ethical constraints associated with collecting data at that level of granularity.\(^46\) These obstacles are not a sufficient excuse, however, for overlooking social-psychological questions about patterns of participation, non-participation, and resistance that aggregated data cannot address.

Second, the three works suggest that comparative scholarship on violence should interpret abuses against civilians as a political and social process, rather than uniform acts of killing or other types of harm. As Finkel states, “Jews not only died in the Holocaust, they also lived in it” (p. 17).\(^47\) Although both the Nazis and targeted communities understood the Holocaust as a “state of exception,” the extreme conditions of the Holocaust did not mean that anti-Semitic violence occurred in the absence of politics. For perpetrators, victims, and rescuers alike, violence coexisted with other political characteristics of wartime life. Struggles over the distribution of authority, control, and the means of survival in Jewish ghettos took place alongside the mass killing, deportation, and non-lethal abuse of Jewish civilians; contests between Jewish minorities and other national groups in the eastern borderlands provided an important political and social context for the outbreak of pogroms. Additionally, some of the violent techniques that perpetrators employed--for example, the public, performative violence of the 1941 pogroms--cannot be explained by instrumentalist theories of violence that
predominate explanations for mass killing. Understanding the political basis for one-sided violence like the Holocaust requires attention to actors’ lives, their decisions in the context of violent social processes, and the consequences of those actions.

Lastly, the empirical strategies for all three books cast important light on the burgeoning literature on the historical legacies of political violence. In each of the books, history casts a long shadow: communities’ past experiences with repression or histories of contention shape their fate during the Holocaust. In some circumstances, as in Kopstein and Wittenberg’s study, a community’s past visibility and capacity for mobilization make them a target for pogrom organizers; in Braun’s and Finkel’s books, those with greater mobilization resources and capacity are better able to resist repression. In some ways, the regularity of the persistence finding is surprising: the places that experience durable effects of political violence are often also places that experience massive upheavals—mass migration, demographic change as a result of death—as a direct and immediate consequence of that violence. These changes certainly characterize the communities that Finkel, Kopstein and Wittenberg, and Braun observe, which transformed rapidly at the onset of World War II. Their common findings about the endogenous effects of past politics, however, suggest relative fixity in the demographic configuration of localities and their communities. Given what we know separately about the population movements and the transformation of social networks that result from war, state collapse, and occupation, their common findings point to perhaps the biggest theoretical and empirical puzzle in the study of the historical legacies of political violence: why, after so many changes, is there persistence? Further research should better articulate the mechanisms of collective transmission of legacies of the past, and provide more clear-cut evidence on them.

Overall, the three books in this review constitute crucial contributions to social-science research about one of the most terrible episodes of violence in human history. The books clearly help us answer fundamental questions about who did what, and why, during the Holocaust, a process comprising a variety of events and repertoires of violence. At the same time, they—individually and together—bring new questions and puzzles forward, which should be taken as a sign of outstanding scientific work. Hopefully, further research will build on these open questions to make additional contributions to the “political science of the Holocaust” and human behavior during genocide in general.


5 King, p. 326.

6 Finkel also uses crossnational data on 667 ghettos in Poland to roughly test for the determinants of ghetto uprisings, and he provides novel descriptive data on 1,126 ghettos that the Nazis established in Poland, the Baltic states, and the USSR.


8 Finkel argues that coping is different than compliance because it conveys some degree of resistance --for example, stealing bread in order to survive. Compliance implies fully conceding to the oppressors' demands. He also distinguishes between collaboration and cooperation (see below).

9 See, for example, Roger S. Gottlieb, “The Concept of Resistance: Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust,” Social Theory and Practice 9, no. 1 (1983): 31–49.


15 Montserrat Roig, Els catalans als camps nazis [Catalans in the Nazi camps]. Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1977. Note that the actions of some of the Ravensbrück prisoners described by Roig might not qualify as resistance for Finkel, who adopts a quite narrow definition and
considers resistance only “organized activities aimed at harming the personnel and property of the perpetrators” (p. 160).


17 Braun argues along the same lines regarding the ability to rescue others; for Braun, the key contextual factor is the local network in which individuals are embedded, which link micro-level motives to community outcomes (Braun, p. 12).


19 Kalyvas.


25 Balcells.


27 Fein.


29 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Of course, public forms of collective action can also be high-risk, as were the ghetto uprisings and other forms of Jewish resistance described by Finkel. See Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer,” *American Journal of Sociology* 92, no. 1 (1986): 64–90.

30 Nicole Fox and Hollie Nyseth Brehm, “‘I Decided to Save Them’: Factors That Shaped Participation in Rescue Efforts during Genocide in Rwanda,” *Social Forces* 96, no. 4 (June 1, 2018): 1625–48.
European Jews were not the only communities targeted for elimination by the Nazi regime. Nazi security forces targeted multiple groups, including Roma and Sinti communities, homosexuals, and people with various physical and intellectual disabilities, whose ascriptive identities placed them at the bottom of the Nazi regime’s racial hierarchy. Whether and how the experiences of these groups compare to those of national groups such as Poles and Ukrainians, whose members also died in great numbers during World War II, remains a subject of significant historical contention.


For some recent advances in collecting this kind of data on ongoing civil wars, see Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob Shapiro, Small Wars, Big Data. The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2018); Jason Lyall, Graeme Blair, and Kosuke Imai, “Explaining Support for Combatants in Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan,” American Political Science Review, 107, no. 4 (November 2013).

Among others, a novel that illustrates this very poignantly is Erica Fischer, Aimée and Jaguar. A Love Story, Berlin 1943 (New York, HarperCollins, 1995).