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Mass Schooling and Catalan Nationalism

LAIA BALCELLS  
Duke University

In 1659, the kingdoms of France and Spain signed the Treaty of Pyrenees, a peace treaty by which a piece of the Spanish territory became part of France. Since then, Catalan identity has persisted on both sides of the border. However, while this identity is today politically and socially relevant in Spain, it is not in France. This article argues that this variation can be explained by the characteristics of the historical process of the spread of mass literacy in each of these countries. Catalan national identity is not salient in French Catalonia because the first generation of mass literates became so under French rule. In contrast, the nonexistence of a scholastic revolution in Spain prior to the beginning of the 20th century allowed for the successful sowing of a Catalan national identity during the first decades of that century. The fact that mass literacy took place in Spanish Catalonia during a period of Catalan nationalist upheaval led to the endurance of this identity.

INTRODUCTION

In 1659, the kingdoms of France and Spain signed the Treaty of Pyrenees, which established peace between these two countries after 11 years of war. Following this treaty, a piece of the Spanish territory inhabited by ethnic Catalans became part of France. Since then, Catalan identity has persisted on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border. During the 19th and 20th centuries, this identity was politicized and turned into the basis of a nationalist movement that aimed at the political sovereignty of the Catalan nation; in other words, a national identity was created. However, neither historically nor today is the salience of this national identity homogeneous across the border: Indeed, while Catalan national identity is politically and socially relevant in Spain, it is almost nonexistent in France. This article analyzes the historical evolution of the Catalan identity in these two territories, focusing
on the pattern of incorporation of this identity into a political ideology: nationalism. The aim is to use this comparison in order to bring new insights into the debate about the factors accounting for Catalan nationalism. This decades-long debate has involved historians, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists, but contributions can still be made. That is particularly the case given recent theoretical developments in the study of nationalism.

The main argument defended in this article is that the variation in the salience of Catalan national identity in French and Spanish Catalonia can be explained by the characteristics of the historical processes of the spread of mass literacy in France and Spain. In other words, I argue that this variation can be explained by the characteristics of the “scholastic revolution” in each of these countries, using Keith Darden’s terminology. I refer mainly to differences in the timing and content of mass literacy. On the one hand, I argue that Catalan nationalism is not salient in France because French Catalans were massively educated under French rule during the second half of the 19th century. In consequence, they became French patriots and they never adopted a Catalan national identity when this identity was mobilized at the beginning of the 20th century. On the other hand, I argue that Catalan nationalism exists and it is salient in Spain because people were never massively educated under a strong and well-organized Spanish state; this allowed for the assimilation of a Catalan national identity when it was mobilized. Additionally, the fact that Catalan nationalist ideology could be spread through schools and other types of institutions (for example, popular associations, newspapers) at the beginning of the 20th century—when the first generation of mass literates was attending school—determined the endurance of this national identity, which did not disappear later on, despite several decades of repression by the Francoist dictatorship (1939–77).

This article contributes to the debate about the origins and development of Catalan nationalism by providing a novel explanation based on a very specific mechanism: schooling. The emphasis on the differences in the timing and content of schooling and mass literacy distinguishes my argument from theories uniquely based on the weakness of the Spanish state, as well as from economic development explanations that have conceived of nationalism as a functional consequence of either industrialization or the spread of mass media.

Unfortunately, the change in the borderline between France and Spain does not provide a natural experiment type of setting: In other words, we cannot assume that the two regions (that is, Spanish and French Catalonia) have exactly the same characteristics except for their belonging to different states. Indeed, these two regions have different sizes, demographic structures, economic and social characteristics, and political statuses within their respective states. Yet, we can perform a process-tracing analysis of the two cases in order to provide “corroborating evidence for a causal argument.”
The article is structured as follows: The next section presents evidence on the variation in the contemporary salience of Catalan national identity in French and Spanish Catalonia. Section three reviews the history of Catalan identity on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border and introduces empirical evidence supporting the argument of the article. Section four concludes and briefly discusses the implications of the findings for the study of nationalism.

VARIATION IN THE SALIENCE OF CATALAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

The dependent variable in this article is the salience of Catalan national identity in two specific territories: the Spanish Autonomous Community of Catalunya (thereafter, also Spanish Catalonia), on the one hand, and the French counties of Rosselló, Cerdanya, Vallespir, Conflent, and Capcir (thereafter, also French Catalonia), on the other. Measuring the salience of national identity is by no means straightforward, and that is especially the case when we are referring to territories and not to individuals. I would argue that a national identity is currently salient in a territory when this identity has a significant impact on the political and social events taking place within it. In this article, I use two indicators in order to measure this variable: a first one is the use of Catalan language in the region; a second one is the support for Catalan nationalist parties in elections. These proxies are not optimal and they imply several measurement issues. For example, Catalan nationalist political parties in Spain, such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Convergencia i Unió (CiU), are programmatically very different from parties such as Les Régionalistes in France. While the former are clear-cut nationalist (and even secessionist) parties, the latter has a weaker nationalist discourse and it makes regionalist demands. Also, while the use of the language is quite a strong indicator of national identity, speaking Catalan does not automatically make anyone a nationalist. These are therefore not perfect indicators. However, they are merely used in order to support an insight that is conventional wisdom, namely that Catalan identity is politically salient in Spain and not in France.

Regarding the first indicator of the salience of Catalan national identity, we can rely on representative surveys in order to get an idea about the patterns of use of Catalan by people of both French and Spanish Catalonia. Table 1 summarizes the use of Catalan in different types of communications, according to surveys implemented in 2003 and 2004. The columns contain data on the percentages of people in the two regions who declare speaking only Catalan, more Catalan than Spanish/French, both languages equally, more Spanish/French than Catalan, and only French/Spanish in communications with family members, with friends, and with neighbors.

Table 1 shows remarkable differences between the two regions. In Spanish Catalonia, Catalan is the main language of communication between members of the family for 37% of the population; also, 7% say that Catalan
TABLE 1 Patterns of Use of Catalan as Language of Communication (2003–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Family</th>
<th></th>
<th>Friends</th>
<th></th>
<th>Neighbors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish Catalonia</td>
<td>French Catalonia</td>
<td>Spanish Catalonia</td>
<td>French Catalonia</td>
<td>Spanish Catalonia</td>
<td>French Catalonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Catalan</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Catalan</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>than Spanish/French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish/French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>than Catalan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


is not the only language, but that it is more usual than Spanish. In French Catalonia, in contrast, only 0.5% of the population use Catalan within the family: French is the main language in family communications for 87.6% of the population. This pattern is similar for communication with friends and neighbors: Indeed, while Catalan is used by a large share of the population in Spanish Catalonia, it has a very limited use in French Catalonia.17

Regarding the second indicator, the comparison of electoral results is not straightforward since the two regions under scrutiny currently belong to two different countries. States vary in their electoral systems and forms of representation, and this affects the way people cast their votes. For this reason, I compare results of the European Parliament elections, which provide comparability to the results obtained by Catalan nationalist parties in each of these countries.18 More specifically, I look at the results of the two last European elections, which were held in June 2004 and June 2009. The parties labelled as Catalan nationalists are Convergència i Unió (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), in Spanish Catalonia, and Les Régionalistes (OC-CAT-ESK), in French Catalonia.19 As aforementioned, these parties are quite different from each other, but they share the commonality of conveying some sort of expression of Catalan nationalism.

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results of the 2004 and 2009 EU elections for Catalan nationalist parties in France and Spain.20 We can see that the differences are striking: In 2004, the percentage of votes for Catalan nationalist parties constituted almost 30% of the votes cast in Spanish Catalonia, while this percentage amounted to less than 1% in French Catalonia. In 2009, the differences are even more significant because Catalan nationalist
TABLE 2 Results of European Elections 2004: Nationalist/Secessionist Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish Catalonia</th>
<th>French Catalonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census of the Region</td>
<td>5,228,861</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>2,104,744</td>
<td>40.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for Nat./Sec. Parties</td>
<td>623,972</td>
<td>29.64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


parties increased their support in Spain (they altogether obtained 31.4% of the votes), but they received no electoral support whatsoever in France.21

In a nutshell, the two indicators used to proxy the salience of Catalan national identity provide us with a clear snapshot of the empirical puzzle that motivates this article: While Catalan national identity is currently salient in Spanish Catalonia, it is remarkably weak in French Catalonia. In the former territory, Catalan is a commonly spoken language, whereas in the latter it is a marginal language, only used by a very small segment of the population and known by its inhabitants to a much lesser extent. Furthermore, nationalism is an important instrument of political and social mobilization in the former territory, whereas it is not in the latter. Indeed, Catalan nationalist parties are extremely relevant in the Spanish Catalonia’s political arena, and they obtain important support in the elections, even in those with a supranational character such as the elections at the European Parliament.22 The recent upsurge in secessionism as well as the increased support towards political parties with a secessionist agenda only confirms this trend.23 The opposite happens in France, where Catalan nationalist parties are almost invisible.

TABLE 3 Results of European Elections 2009: Nationalist/Secessionist Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish Catalonia</th>
<th>French Catalonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census of the Region</td>
<td>5,370,606</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>1,984,066</td>
<td>36.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for Nat./Sec. Parties</td>
<td>623,023</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TIMING OF CATALAN NATIONALISM

The emergence of Catalan nationalism as a political movement is generally thought to have taken place at the end of the 19th century. Historians seem to agree that it was then that a previously extant ethnic Catalan identity started to politicize.

The process by which Catalan ethnic identity became politicized and transformed into a national identity can be thought of as the result of a “movement of national revival,” in Miroslav Hroch’s terminology. Hroch postulates that national revival processes are characterized by three phases: a Phase A of “scholarly interest” in the identity (past language, culture), a Phase B of “patriotic agitation,” and a Phase C of “mass national movement.” I would argue that there were differences between Spanish Catalonia and French Catalonia in each of these phases, but that the most important differences can be found in Phase B and in the conditions under which this phase of patriotic agitation took place. As we will see, this highly determined the diverging fates of Catalan nationalism in each of these two territories.

Hroch argues that “The beginning of every national revival is marked by a passionate concern on the part of a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the oppressed nationality.” This depiction seems to match perfectly the Catalan case: Indeed, historians have outlined the impact of a cultural and historic movement that began in Catalonia in the mid-19th century. This movement, La Renaixència (1830–80), intended to revitalize the Catalan language and culture on the basis of the romantic conception of the medieval past of the nation. Historian Albert Balcells argues that La Renaixència played a crucial role in the preparation of the atmosphere in which Catalan nationalism was to emerge, and he underscores that this movement succeeded in converting a vernacular Catalan language into a modern literary language. The latter was important because illiteracy was widespread in Spanish Catalonia prior to the 19th century. Thus, the maternal and popular language acquired the possibility of becoming a literary language at the same time that the number of potential readers was starting to increase. The will to have a Catalan literature heightened the need to Catalanize the school, which—in turn—fuelled the nationalist movement, for Catalan elites thought that the only way to have a Catalan school was to achieve a certain degree of political autonomy or independence.

La Renaixència was particularly relevant in Spanish Catalonia, but it also took place in French Catalonia. In fact, when one of the main celebrations of the period, Els Jocs Florals, was banned in Spanish Catalonia in 1901, a bishop of French Catalonia, Juli Carsalade du Pont, organized them in Perpignan, the capital of the French region. Also, there is a record of several Catalan patriotic writings in French Catalonia during this period. Yet, the
movement was overall less prevalent in French Catalonia, where it was not as successful in bringing Catalan up to the status of a literary language.  

Hroch’s period of “patriotic agitation” (Phase B) links the period of “scholarly interest” (Phase A) with the “rise of a mass movement” (Phase C), which takes place in the concluding phase of national revival. During Phase B, “patriots” try to influence members of the nationality and to make them consider their membership in the nation as more than a simple natural fact. In other words, it is the phase of fermentation of the national consciousness. In Catalonia, it can be argued that this period started during the last years of *La Renaixença* and that it took place in a more obvious way during the first decades of the 20th century.

Indeed, while *La Renaixença* had a literary and cultural character at the beginning, it had become political by its end. With the Monarchic restoration in Spain in 1875, some sectors of Catalan society started to ask for the political recognition of *Catalunya*. A Catalanist political movement very slowly started to organize and to solidify its demands. In 1880, the First Catalanist Congress (*Primer Congrés Catalanista*) took place. In 1892, the Catalanist Union (*Unió Catalanista*), which united different Catalanist associations, met in the town of Manresa, where it approved the bases for a Catalan Constitution (*Les Bases de Manresa*) and it made a claim for an autonomous government for *Catalunya*. Later on, a Catalanist conservative political party, *La Lliga Regionalista*, was formed; this party became hegemonic in the Catalan political sphere between 1901 and 1923. Political Catalanism lost impetus between 1923–30 (during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship), but it resurfaced again in 1931, with the establishment of the Second Republic.

In 1914, a Catalan self-government institution (*La Mancomunitat*) was created. This institution performed important tasks in the building of infrastructure (that is, roads and bridges), railroad systems, telephonic systems, and so on. Simultaneously, it created a number of cultural and scientific institutions aimed at giving more prestige to the Catalan language and culture (for example, *Institut d’Estudis Catalans*, *Biblioteca de Catalunya*). Catalanism became quite prevalent in the public sphere during the first three decades of the 20th century: Catalan newspapers were created and different sorts of popular associations (for example, youth associations, cultural associations, etc.) joined the nationalist discourse.

At the same time that these political changes were taking place in Spanish Catalonia, French Catalonia was living in relative political calm. French Catalan intellectuals and regional elites did not make political appeals similar to the ones made by intellectuals south of the border, and French Catalonia never achieved any sort of political autonomy within the French state. Hence, if Phase A of the national revival movement was already displaying some divergences between French and Spanish Catalonia, Phase B showed extremely diverging patterns in these two territories. These differences are to
a great extent explained by the schooling policies that had been undertaken by these states during the 19th century.

According to Darden’s scholastic revolution theoretical framework, the origins of nationalism lay in the development of mass schooling, literacy, and standardized and centrally controlled curricula, which provided the means for establishing shared ideas across large, geographically dispersed populations. The creation of a national identity was not only due to mass literacy, which facilitated the transmission of ideas across time and space, but also to the existence of centrally controlled curricula, which facilitated the transmission of homogeneous ideological messages. Furthermore, “the ideas initially introduced through schooling were more enduring as they became accepted as commonplace truth and instilled in the popular culture.”

Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse have shown that nationalism and anticommunism during the late Soviet period was strong in those territories of the former Soviet Union in which the scholastic revolution took place prior to the incorporation into the USSR. In contrast, nationalism was not salient in those territories in which the scholastic revolution took place under Soviet rule. In the former territories the (pre-Soviet) national identity was transmitted across generations, despite the later Soviet invasion and Sovietization. Pre-Soviet national identities were enduring because the first generation of readers in a family (that is, those affected by the scholastic revolution) introduced the national sentiment with which they had achieved literacy into the family in a way that was retained by subsequent generations. Thus, the family was the main vessel of transmission of national identity once its members became literate. Darden and Grzymala-Busse explain how the scholastic revolution theory differentiates itself from other modernization theories:

Although education is typically seen as part of a bundle of developments—urbanization, industrialization, income growth—due to the legacy of modernization theory, the role of education is causally and empirically distinct. Schooling provides the one clear channel for the deliberate and systematic inculcation of a set of values. And the critical aspect of mass literacy is its timing: the national ideas instilled in a population during the first round of mass schooling—when a community first shifts from an oral to a literate mass culture—are durable, and the first schooled generation will transmit those values in ways that previous or subsequent cohorts do not.

Going back to the Catalan case, the main difference between France and Spain at the beginning of the 20th century was that while France had already undertaken a nation-building process, which relied quite strongly on the schooling system and on the spread of mass literacy, Spain had not. State-promoted nation-building impeded the fermentation of Catalan nationalist ideas in France because a first schooled generation had already
been socialized as French patriots. In Spain, the process of nation-building had more or less failed, and so did the scholastic revolution; in consequence, nationalist ideas could ferment well among the Catalan population during the aforementioned Phase B. As Peter Sahlins put it, “In Spain, Catalan nationalism made its appearance: the nation became Catalonia, and it became politicized. But the claims of Catalan nationalism found little resonance in the Catalan counties north of the border, where the nation remained France.”45

In the aftermath of the French revolution, the French state started a nationwide public school system, which achieved its maturity during the Third Republic (1870–1940). “There were about thirty-six thousand schools in France by 1829, and twice that many in 1906.”46 This system aimed at spreading literacy across the territory and also at educating children under the values of the French Republic, which they had to consider their own nation. The schooling laws of 1881–82 (also called the Ferry Laws) became the main legal support of a process of cultural and linguistic homogenization of the country.47

The French scholastic revolution encouraged the mass assimilation of a French national identity across the territory of the state. This process took place despite the previous existence of ethnic identities (for example, Catalan, Basque, Breton, Occitan), and it was made possible by strong repressive measures against the use of patois and against the maintenance of regional cultural traits.48 Furthermore, the scholastic revolution was accompanied and facilitated by other types of nation-building measures: “The Republic fur- thered the policies of road and railway construction begun under the Second Empire and introduced new laws of mandatory military service and universal compulsory primary schooling, thus making the technological and cultural assimilation of peasants into Frenchmen.”49

As Eugen Weber has well explained, the schoolteacher had a very relevant role in the task of spreading literacy and also channelled the cultural homogenization of France.50 For example, Christian Camps argues that in 1886 circa 34.5% of teachers of French Catalonia were not indigenous to the region and that this permitted a greater introduction of French within the schools because teachers did not know Catalan.51 In addition, Catalan was prohibited in schools. Furthermore, a state-wide structured system promoted the standardized (that is, homogeneous) formation of schoolteachers; the idea was to help spread the same type of education across the country.52

Catalans of France were totally subjected to this process of mass schooling and induced cultural homogenization by the French state. Following the scholastic revolution framework, we can assume that the main effect of this wave of mass education—by which children of illiterate parents were taught in French and in the values of the French Republic and Patrie—was their adoption of a French national identity. This French identity was then reproduced within the families and therefore persisted.
But, what was happening in Spain during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century? Was the Spanish nation built? If not, why? How did this influence the creation and mass assimilation of a Catalan national identity? Several authors have tied the advent of Catalanism to the weakness of the Spanish state. What Sahlins, for example, says about the county of Cerdanya, which was split by the Treaty of Pyrenees, is: “The two Cerdanyas were definitively tied to the historical trajectories of their respective polities: the French Cerdagne experienced an economic assimilation and cultural integration into France, whereas the Spanish Cerdanya partook of the structural underdevelopment of Spain and of the claims of Catalan nationalism.” However, what is the exact mechanism that links the weakness of the Spanish state with the relative success of Catalan nationalism? I argue that it is not state weakness per se but rather the absence of a Spanish scholastic revolution during the 19th and 20th centuries that permitted the assimilation of a Catalan national identity by the inhabitants of Spanish Catalonia at the beginning of the 20th century. During the period of patriotic agitation Catalan people were likely to adopt a Catalan national identity because they were not massively literate and they had not previously assimilated a Spanish national identity. In other words, had they been exposed to a process of mass schooling in Castilian and imbued with the values of the Spanish nation, they would probably not have adopted a Catalan national identity.

Fernando García de Cortázar and José Manuel González argue that “If in France the educational reform was crucial in the development of the national unity by abolishing the ‘particularities’ and the regional languages, in Spain the deficient schooling truncated this possibility, permitting the persistence of the local languages.” However, the Spanish state was by no means more tolerant with minorities as compared to the French state. Since the 18th century, the Spanish state had enacted regulations prohibiting the use of Catalan and other minority languages in education (for example, Real Cédula de Aranjuez, 1768; Ley Moyano, 1857; Real Decreto, 1902), which were envisioned to achieve a cultural homogenization across the Spanish territory. Yet, the regulations in these laws could not be enforced at the time because the Spanish state school system was in extremely poor shape.

Some authors argue that the Spanish school system owes its deficiencies to the liberal reforms of the 19th century; quite especially the Desamortización de Mendizábal (1836–37) and Madoz (1855), which dismantled the apparatus of elementary education sustained by local governments or the Catholic Church. The lack of state resources and a quite violent 19th century (with three civil wars—the Carlist wars; different transitions from a monarchy to a liberal system; and the wars against the United States over Cuba and the Philippines) also account for the underdevelopment of Spanish schools. Finally, the rural character of the Spanish state—in combination with economic underdevelopment—hindered the creation of a structured school system. Schooling was very often resisted by the people themselves: “It was
mainly in the rural areas of the country where the constraints and resistances for schooling were created; the school institution was considered imposed, costly and useless.\textsuperscript{58} Lower class families often neglected school attendance.

In addition to the weakness of the Spanish state and to the absence of a proper Spanish scholastic revolution, the fact that the spread of mass literacy took place in Spanish Catalonia during a period in which Catalan nationalism was prevalent in the political sphere (that is, the first decades of the 20th century) had important consequences for the mass assimilation and endurance of Catalan national identity. First, with the creation of the autonomous institution of \textit{La Mancomunitat} in 1914, a process of public schooling in Catalan was set off: “With \textit{La Mancomunitat}, [Catalan] became once again an official language [...]; new schools were created, as well as institutions where it was the main or the exclusive language.”\textsuperscript{59} Second, the private sector, which was not particularly keen on the (Spanish) state, had an increased role in elementary education in Catalan during the first decades of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{60} This had important implications for the nature of schooling as well as for its ideological content.\textsuperscript{61}

It can in fact be argued that during the first decades of the 20th century there was in Catalonia a process of education in a general framework of suspicion against the state, expressed in some form of apoliticism or with antisystem proposals.\textsuperscript{62} This process was led by the private educational sector, which was often religious\textsuperscript{63} but other times secular. Some of these schools were clearly confrontational with the state. For example, the anarchist movement started to develop an alternative educational project at the verge of the 20th century, The Modern School (\textit{L’Escola Moderna}) of Ferrer i Guàrdia, which had 47 branches in 1906, when it was shut down after anarchist Mateu Morral (Ferrer i Guàrdia’s librarian) attempted to kill the King of Spain Alfonso XIII. According to Alexandre Gali, these anarchist and other popular (that is, working class) schools continued to operate clandestinely until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.\textsuperscript{64} Among popular schools, there were also schools that aimed at gender equality.\textsuperscript{65}

The Catalanist movement created the first Catalan school in Barcelona in 1898 (school \textit{Sant Jordi}); more Catalan schools were created later, and they organized the Association for the Protection of the Catalan Education (APEC or \textit{La Protectora}).\textsuperscript{66} This association promoted the publication of books for Catalan schools, which aimed at teaching the history and geography of Catalunya. The association observed a significant increase during the first two decades of the 20th century: It went from 93 schools in 1910 to 121 in 1920.\textsuperscript{67}

Schoolteachers had an important role in the socialization of the students with the values of the Catalan nation. Unlike France, in Spain teachers were not instructed on a homogeneous basis, and they therefore did not necessarily feel connected to the Spanish state. In addition, the Catalanist movement created a School of Pedagogy (\textit{Escola de Mestres}) to train teachers in Catalan
TABLE 4 Illiteracy in France and French Catalonia in the 19th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1894</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Catalonia</td>
<td>56.37%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (all Departments)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>16.45%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


pedagogy and to instil Catalan patriotic values on the educators. Thus, schools became crucial sites of contestation of national identity during this period. Although this was clearly the case when schooling was conducted in Catalan, it was also the case when schooling was conducted in Castilian. Children were not generally instructed on the basis of Spanish patriotic values; in other words, they did not bridge the learning of Castilian to loyalty to a Spanish nation.

During the period of the Spanish 2nd Republic (1931–39), the Catalan schooling system was enhanced due to the Republican ideals of mass literacy and fair education. Public schools were a competence of the regional government of Catalonia (La Generalitat) and they had a Catalan curriculum. These schools were key in the spread of mass literacy in Catalonia.

In a nutshell, Catalan public schools (of the periods of political autonomy), anarchist and popular schools, and private Catalanist or religious schools made an important contribution to the existence of a somewhat alternative scholastic revolution in Spanish Catalonia at the beginning of the 20th century. They socialized a first generation of literate citizens with values of either suspicion against the Spanish state or love for the Catalan nation. All of this happened at the same time that a national movement was growing at the political and societal level, and it influenced the spread and endurance of Catalan nationalism.

In Tables 4 and 5, we can see data on literacy rates in France and French Catalonia in the 19th century and data on literacy rates in Spain and Spanish Catalonia in the 19th and 20th centuries.

TABLE 5 Illiteracy in Spain and Spanish Catalonia in the 19th and 20th Centuries

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Catalonia</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</table>

Table 4 depicts the rate of illiteracy in three different dates (1855, 1885, and 1894) for the Département des Pyrénées Orientales (that is, French Catalonia) and the mean rate of illiteracy in all the départements of France (a total of 80), as well as the standard deviation and the median for all of France.\textsuperscript{73} We can see the level of illiteracy in French Catalonia decreased from 56.4\% in 1855 to 38.2\% in 1885. This implies a difference of 18.2 percentage points in this 30-year period. For all the départements of France, the differences between these two periods are even more striking: In 1855, the mean level of illiteracy in all of France was 42\%; in 1885, the mean level of illiteracy was 16.5\%—with a standard deviation much smaller than the standard variation in 1855, which implies that the differences between regions diminished. Thus, between 1855 and 1885, the average level of illiteracy of all France decreased by 25.5 percentage points. In 1894, the average rate of illiteracy was 8.5\% in all France, and 21.4\% in French Catalonia. The latter can be considered a low rate of illiteracy for the end of the 19th century. In short, the data indicate that by the end of the 19th century the spread of mass literacy had materialized in France and French Catalonia.

Table 5 depicts the rate of illiteracy in Spain and Spanish Catalonia from 1887 to 1981 (in decades). We can observe that levels of illiteracy were much higher as compared to French Catalonia at the end of the 19th century. In 1887, the level of illiteracy in Spanish Catalonia was 60\% (recall that in French Catalonia it was 38.2\% in 1885). In 1900, it continued to be much higher than in French Catalonia at 53\%, which doubles the rate of illiteracy in French Catalonia in 1894. In Spanish Catalonia, an important decrease in the rate of illiteracy did not take place until the 1910s and 1920s, and this region did not reach a moderate rate of illiteracy (that is, 21\%) until the decade of the 1930s. By 1940, despite the mayhem of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the rate of illiteracy was already 14\%.

Importantly, the data in Table 5 show that in Spanish Catalonia the increase in literacy took place precisely during the years when pro-Catalan educators were at the peak of their influence, namely the three first decades of the 20th century. Also, if we compare the illiteracy rates from Spain and Spanish Catalonia, we can observe that Catalonia was under the average of illiteracy of the country for the whole period 1887–1981, but that the gap widened significantly in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, and it only started to shrink in the 1940s and 1950s. That is consistent with the idea that Catalonia underwent during those decades a scholastic revolution that was somewhat independent from the rest of Spain.

The data on literacy in Tables 4 and 5 are thus strongly supportive of the thesis in this article. The data show that the spread of mass literacy took place in French Catalonia well before it did in Spanish Catalonia. By the end of the 19th century, 80\% of the population in French Catalonia was literate. People in French Catalonia had been exposed to the scholastic revolution led by the French state during the last half of the 19th century.
and they acquired a French national identity. At the beginning of the 20th century, when the phase of Catalan national revival took place, people in French Catalonia already had a French national identity. This explains why the phase of national revival was not successful in this region and Catalan national identity was not assimilated by the masses. In contrast, only 40% of the population in Spanish Catalonia were literate by the end of the 19th century. That is, when the Catalan national revival movement emerged most people in Spanish Catalonia did not have an ingrained national identity. These people were therefore apt to assimilate the national identity that was being mobilized (that is, Catalan). And the decades of utmost increase in literacy rates in Spanish Catalonia were precisely those decades in which Catalan nationalism was relatively strong in the political arena and in which education was partially undertaken in Catalan. This led to the assimilation of a Catalan national identity by the first generation of literates, which gave Catalan identity the potential to endure.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has addressed the question of what explains the variation in the salience of Catalan national identity across the Franco-Spanish border, and it has aimed to provide further insights into the long debate about the origins of Catalan nationalism. In order to do this, it has connected Darhen's theory on the origins of nationalism to a particular periodization of national revival movements, and it has done a process-tracing analysis of the evolution of Catalan nationalism in these two regions since their division in the 17th century. The article has shown that current patterns are likely to be explained by historical differences in the state-building processes in Spain and France and—more specifically—by differences in mass schooling policies, which affected the creation and assimilation of a mass Catalan national identity in each of these territories. On the one hand, in Spanish Catalonia, mass literacy took place significantly later than in French Catalonia. This explains the diverging levels of support for the Catalan nationalist movement in French Catalonia and Spanish Catalonia when it emerged at the end of the 19th century. On the other hand, in Spanish Catalonia, the process by which the majority of the people became literate during the first three decades of the 20th century was not fully controlled by the Spanish state. Instead, it was controlled by Catalanist sectors, which taught in Catalan language and linked the language to a Catalan nation; by libertarian sectors that educated while displaying hostility against the state; or by religious sectors that did not feel especially attached to the state. By contrast, in France, the process of mass literacy had been highly commanded by the state, and it had bridged literacy to the teaching of patriotic values. All of the above
explains why in Spanish Catalonia a Catalan national identity was assimilated by the masses and endured (so that national identity is salient nowadays), while in French Catalonia the French national identity is the one that persisted.

Hroch depicts the state of the art of nationalism studies in the following way: “Every historian of national movements agrees there are numerous data gaps in our understanding of them. In this sense, all defensible conclusions remain no more than partial findings, and all ‘theories’ should be taken as projects for further research. Polemically, one might say that at the moment we have an overproduction of theories and a stagnation of comparative research on the topic.” This article has the merit of not introducing a novel theory but rather testing a recently introduced theory with an important case. By showing that a theory accounting for variation in the former Soviet Union can also be explanatory of a Western European case, the article is making a clear contribution to the literature.

In addition, the framework hereby presented is not frontally challenging well-established explanations of Catalan nationalism; rather, it nuances them in the light of new theories and empirical evidence. If anything, the article supports a constructivist standpoint as opposed to instrumentalist perspectives, which tend to overestimate the importance of economic incentives of Catalan elites and their role in promoting a particular national identity among rank-and-file citizens. Instrumentalism cannot explain why Catalan national identity was politicized only in Spain—and not in France—and it cannot explain why Catalan national identity has endured over time. For example, Catalan national identity has persisted after decades of systematic repression during Franco’s dictatorship (1939–77), when instrumental incentives should have led people to abandon this identity. The theory in this article accounts for this endurance, and it predicts the persistence of Catalanism in the future. Indeed, despite the fact that the Spanish state has recently approved some laws aimed at reducing the presence of Catalan language in schools and—in this way—promoting the assimilation of Catalans into a Spanish national identity, this seems unlikely to happen. Catalan identity is now crystallized in a massively literate society; thus, following the scholastic revolution framework, it is too late for the Spanish state to instil a national identity through schooling.

Overall, the evidence in this article is supportive of the idea that the building of a national identity is a prolonged process, and it does not only hinge on the short-term motivations of politicians. As we have seen, the reaction of the masses—and not only the elites—is also explanatory of these processes. Finally, this article shows that the context surrounding the process of nation-building is not superfluous and that it clearly determines the nature and endurance of nationalism.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author thanks Keith Darden, Carles Boix, Maria José Hierro, Marc San-jaume, four anonymous referees, and the editor Adrian Guelke for comments and suggestions to previous versions of this article.

NOTES


2. The current counties of Roussillon, Conflent, Capcir, Vallespir, and northern Cerdanya were ceded to the French crown. Llívia did not become part of the French kingdom because the treaty stipulated that only villages were to be ceded to France, and Llívia was considered a town.


7. Darden, Resisting Occupation.


11. While Spanish Catalonia has the status of Autonomous Community within the Spanish decentralized system, French Catalonia roughly corresponds to a province within the highly centralized French state.


13. This region corresponds roughly to the Département 66: Pyrénées Orientales (also Département de Languedoc-Roussillon) within the French state, although the correspondence with the French department is not perfect (there is a county, La Fenolleda, included in the French Dep. 66 that is considered Occitan, not Catalan). Nonetheless, in this article, I will consider these two entities (French Catalonia and Dep. 66) as the same thing for this is the most plausible way to proceed in order to study the region analytically.


16. The Survey of Linguistic Uses of Catalonia 2003 (Enquesta d’usos lingüístics a Catalunya 2003) consisted of telephone interviews with 7,257 individuals (older than 15) distributed across the territory of Spanish Catalonia. The Survey of Linguistic Uses of North Catalonia 2004 (Enquesta d’usos lingüístics a la Catalunya Nord 2004) was based on telephone interviews with 400 individuals (older than 15) in the territory of French Catalonia. Whereas there is a more recent (2008) survey on the use of Catalan in Spanish Catalonia, which shows similar patterns, there is not a similarly recent survey for French Catalonia.

17. According to a Feb. 2013 survey by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO), 58% of people in Spanish Catalonia consider Catalan to be their language (llengua pròpia); 33% of Catalans consider Spanish to be their language, and 7.7% consider both Catalan and Spanish to be their languages.

18. Elections for the European Parliament take place simultaneously in all EU countries (with two or three days of lag, at maximum), and the electoral system is the same (that is, proportional representation) across countries. Yet, the number of constituencies varies across countries: In Spain, there is a single constituency, whereas in France there are eight constituencies. There is also variation in the number of deputies at the EU Parliament chosen by each country: while France chooses 78 deputies, Spain chooses 54 deputies.

19. There are some additional nationalist parties in Catalonia (Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència [SI], Reagrupament, Candidatura d’Unitat Popular [CUP]), but these were created very recently and did not compete in the considered elections.

20. For each of the territories, I have added the total number of votes obtained by these political parties and calculated the percentage that these votes represent over the total.

21. In 2004, Catalan, Occitan, and Basque candidates ran together with Les ràgionalistes. In 2009, there were no Catalan candidates in the lists (only Basques) so I do not count any votes for them.


23. According to recent polls by the CEO (June 2013 and Oct. 2012), 75% of Catalans would be in favor of the celebration of a referendum on the independence of Catalonia, and 55% would vote “Yes” in such a referendum. According to a different survey implemented in July 2012 (Laia Balcells, José Fernández-Albertos, and Alexander Kuo, “Territory, Identity, and Preferences for Redistribution. An Experimental Approach,” Working Paper [Barcelona: Catedra Pasqual Maragall d’Economia i Territori, Universitat de Barcelona, Sep. 2012]), 54% of Catalans would vote in favor of independence in a referendum. According to the same survey from July 2012, 22% of Catalans identify as “only Catalan” and 23% identify as “more Catalan than Spanish”; 40% identify “as Catalan as Spanish,” 4% identify as “more Spanish than Catalan,” and 12% identify as “only Spanish.”


25. Some authors disagree with this periodization: Carles Boix, for instance, says that the struggle for the redefinition of the Spanish state had taken place in Catalonia before the politicization of the language and the culture at the end of the 19th century. Boix, L’Obertura Catalana.

26. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). In Hroch’s framework, Catalonia would be a nation of Type b: “a group of nations which did indeed constitute political entities in the Middle-Ages, had their own sovereign feudal class, but lost their political independence or its essential attributes before they developed into modern nations.” 9.

27. Ibid., 23.


29. Juan Díez Medrano, Naciones Divididas: Clase, Política y Nacionalismo en el País Vasco y Cataluña, Monografías 167 (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1999), 11.


31. Ibid., 21.
32. Ibid., 23.
33. *Els Jocs Florals* were poetry and prose festivals and contests, which would take place during springtime.
35. In the rise of the mass movement, “national consciousness has become the concern of the broad masses (even if still by no means the whole of the nation’s members) and the national movement has a firm organizational structure extending over the whole territory”; Hroch, *Social Preconditions*, 23.
36. Ibid.
37. A left-wing Catalanist political party (*Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*) was created in 1931 and received widespread support in the different elections of the Second Republic (1931–39). Thus, during the Second Republic, the main left- and right-wing political parties in Catalonia were ERC and the Lliga Regionalista, respectively.
38. Hence, this institution undertook what are commonly thought of as state-building tasks.
40. Darden, Resisting Occupation.
41. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
42. Ibid, 40.
43. Darden and Gryzmala-Busse, “The Great Divide.”
44. Ibid., 90.
52. “The French elementary school was, on the whole, a mass school. It was also a much more uniform school. From the earliest days of the Empire, the ‘departmental regulations for State schools’ […] worked towards a standardisation to which everything was in any case contributing at once: the growing importance of the teaching college graduates—with their identical cultural background—within the teaching profession.” François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, eds., *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 147.
56. The most important of these laws was the *Ley Moyano*, which regulated all levels of education and planned a universal, centralized, free, and public schooling. It also planned the obligation to teach Castilian grammar and orthography as a unique language.
58. Ibid., 206.
59. Joan Martí, *L’Us Social de la Llengua Catalana* (Barcelona: Barcanova, 1992), 47. Following the demands of Catalan politicians, the Spanish Congress of Deputies presented a Law proposal on 8 July 1916 in favor of “the free usage of the Catalan language within Catalonia.”
60. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were circa 60,000 children of scholarly age in Barcelona, and slots in public schools for only 13,317 of them. This lack of supply of public education led to an outburst of private education. Pere Solà, *Educació i Moviment Llibertari a Catalunya (1901–1939)* (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1980), 20–21.
61. Private schools often sought forms to regenerate the old-style educational system, following pedagogical tendencies from other parts of Europe (for example, the Montessori system); Pere Solà, *Educació i Societat a Catalunya* (Vic: Eumo, 2010).


63. Sèverine Dard, “La Educación Popular Católica en Barcelona Durante la Restauración: De la Beneficencia a la ‘Cuestión Social,’” *Historia de la Educación* 20: 67–93 (2001); Martí, *L’Us Social de la Llengua Catalana*, 47. Els Escolapis, which had an important network of schools in Catalonia since the 18th century, was the most important Catholic congregation in elementary education. The church had been supportive of the Catalan language since early times. For example, in 1727, at a moment when public forces were pursuing measures against Catalan, the Ecclesiastic Council of Tarragona agreed on doing predication in this language. See Josep Maria Solé i Sabaté and Joan Villarroja, *El Català, una Lengua Asediada* (Barcelona: Columna, 1995).

64. Alexandre Gali, *Història de les Institucions i del Moviment Cultural a Catalunya 1900–1936*, *Llibre II Ensenyament Primari* (Barcelona: Fundació Alexandre Gali, 1978), 30–32. Unsurprisingly, anarchist schools were seen with a lot of suspicion by members of the Catalan bourgeoisie such as Alexandre Gali.

65. Rosa Sensat, who was a leader of the feminist pedagogical movement, was also committed to the promotion of Catalan in schools. Solà, *Educació i Societat*.

66. Among these schools, the most important was the *Miüta Escolar Blanquerna*, which became an iconic institution for the Catalan bourgeoisie who wanted to build a regenerationist Catalan school. Fundació Pi i Sunyer, *La Confiscació d’Antics Centres d’Ensenyament de Tipus Catalanista: Dos Informes (1939)* (Barcelona: Fundació Pi i Sunyer, 2004), 20–21.


70. Some of these schools were well known for their excellence. The *Institut-Escola*, for example, was the high school of political or literary celebrities such as Maria Aurèlia Campmany or Josep M. Ainaud de Lasarte, among others.

71. In interviews with Spanish Civil War survivors, several testimonies recounted their experiences in these schools. Some said that in these schools they achieved political ideals of Republicanism and Catalanism, which they did not lose thereafter and which they transmitted to their offspring. For more details on these interviews, see, Laia Balcells, “The Consequences of Victimization on Political Identities: Evidence from Spain,” *Politics & Society* 40(3): 309–345 (2012).

72. Following practice in the literature, the rate of illiteracy for France is measured by the number of individuals not able to write their name in the marriage acts among 100 married. It is assumed that literate people are capable of signing the acts of marriage with their name and not making a design or a cross. Hence, the data are measuring literacy in general and not in a particular language. For Spain, the data are from censuses that captured the total number of people over 10 years old who did not know how to read. That is, people who could read but could not write were not counted as illiterate. To the best of my knowledge, there was no reference to a specific language in the censuses questions. See Mercedes Vilanova and Xavier Moreno, *Atlas de la Evolució del Analfabetisme en España de 1887 a 1981* (Madrid: CIDE, 1992), 101–119.

73. The data on France have been obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Study Num. 48. This study compiles data from (1) *Statistique Générale de la France*, (2) *Mouvement de la population, 1801–1868*, (3) *Statistique Annuelle, 1869–1897*, and (4) *Statistique de l’enseignement primaire*. See ICPSR, *Study Number 48: Social, Demographic and Educational Data for France, 1801–1897* (Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR, 2009).

74. The puzzle of the diverging fates of national identities across state borders is not unique to Catalonia. It appears within a variety of other ethnic groups whose areas of settlement span state borders (the Kurds, Ukrainians, etc.).

75. Darden, *Resisting Occupation*. 
77. Ibid., 78.
78. Darden and Gryzma-Busse, “The Great Divide.”
80. During Francoism, Catalan schools were shut down and Catalan was prohibited in schools as well as in all public spaces. There was severe repression towards any manifestation of a Catalan identity. Fundació Pi i Sunyer, *La Confiscació d’Antics Centres*.
81. This insight relates to Jason Wittenberg’s finding on political persistence in Hungary during communism. He emphasizes the role of churches at the local level in promoting spaces of dissidence. I instead emphasize the family as the main vessel of transmission. See Jason Wittenberg, *Crucibles of Political Loyalty Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
82. The Spanish Minister of Education, José Ignacio Wert, said in Oct. 2012 that the aim of the new Education Law he was drafting—and which was approved on 17 May 2013—was to turn Catalan pupils into Spaniards. “Wert reconoce que el Gobierno pretende españolizar a los alumnos catalanes” (Oct. 2012), *El Huffington Post*, http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2012/10/10/wert-reconoce-que-el-gobi_n_1953516.html (accessed 31 May 2013).

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